China is intent on maintaining its influence over Korea in future decades, and current policy is crafted with a view to hedging its bets so that Beijing does not alienate or unnecessarily antagonize either Pyongyang or Seoul. The result is that China pursues a policy that is cautious, low-keyed, and that avoids overreaction or excessive drama, anything that might adversely affect future ties. Beijing views Korea as a "natural [Chinese] sphere of influence" and sees the peninsula's future as being inexorably linked with that of China.
1
Continuity and Change in China's Korea Policy There has been both continuity and change in China's policy toward the Korean peninsula. The continuity has been in Beijing's support for Pyongyang, although the direction and context of this support has undergone considerable change. There has also been continuity in the challenge that the Korean peninsula has presented to China over the past half century. The PRC faced a dilemma over Korea right from the start and this was evident in late 1950 as Beijing's top leaders agonized over whether or not to intervene in the Korean War. While China's paramount leader Mao Zedong was clearly predisposed to intervene, many leaders had serious reservations and still others strongly opposed intervention. Nothing short of a high-level policy debate ensued.
2 The major changes in China's outlook toward the peninsula have been its shift from a "One-Korea" to a "Two-Korea" policy, and from a strictly military/security focus to a broader strategic context with an emphasis on economics.
Two main phases can be discerned in China's Korea policy since 1949: a oneKorea policy (1949-mid-1980s ) and a two-Korea policy (1980s-present). These main phases can each be further divided into two subphases. China was a de facto military ally of North Korea from the late 1940s-a role cemented during the Korean War (1950-53) and formalized by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961. By the 1970s, Beijing's support of Pyongyang had become more restrained and qualified. Then in the mid-1980s-in tandem with China's broader strategic reorientation from preparing for imminent global conflict in the era of Mao Zedong to anticipating an epoch of overall peace and economic development in the Deng Xiaoping era-Beijing adopted a more pragmatic, less doctrinaire approach to the Korean peninsula. At first, the "two Koreas" approach was de facto, but in 1992 the approach became de jure when China established full diplomatic relations with South Korea.
China's contribution to inter-Korea conflict management has been significant. Since 1999, in particular, Chinese influence on North Korea has resulted in decreased tensions as a more confident and seemingly moderate Pyongyang has begun to engage Seoul. Admittedly, North Korea's shift has not been smooth or without setbacks: indeed it has come in fits and starts with periodic reversals and frequent holding patterns. It is unclear whether this is a strategic shift or merely a tactical tap dance by Pyongyang. In any event, this apparent change did not translate into a less threatening or forward deployed Korean People's Army (KPA) along the DMZ.
3 Nor has this change resulted in North Korea curtailing its nuclear or ballistic and cruise missile programs as the revelation of October 2002 and subsequent actions, such as the cruise missile tests in the Sea of Japan in February and March 2003, have shown.
